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Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 2/4/00
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg. . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt.. . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,  
   13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt. . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60.99
73.00
81.63
91.41
30.50
23.00
92.60
61.50
150.00
67.75
91.52
97.13
105.34
36.75
46.41
99.20
*
156.00
68.09
87.25
97.97
105.80
40.50
56.23
108.30
*
148.00
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Sioux City, IA , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.06
2.01
4.78
3.47
*
2.84
1.81
4.41
3.04
1.19
2.84
1.90
4.67
3.23
1.24
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
*
*
70.00
100.00
33.75
60.00
82.50
32.50
*
* No market.
Attempts by agricultural economists to estimate the
relationship between captive supplies1 and spot cattle prices
span over thirty years. What we know is that the relation-
ship is negative. That is, when captive supply usage goes
up, spot cattle prices go down. What we don’t know is
whether or not the negative relationship means that an
increase in captive supply usage causes a decline in cattle
prices, thus hurting independent cattle producers. Results of
a recent  investigative research report,2 using an extensive
data set from the Texas Panhandle, suggests that the
observed negative relationship should not be taken as
causation.         
The report made a point of distinguishing between two
different "levels of analysis" at which the relationship
between captive supplies and spot prices can be explored. 
At the "plant level" the question was whether packing
plants that anticipate relatively large volumes of captive
supply deliveries in the near-term future tend to pay spot
market cattle prices that are low relative to regional
average prices  (the region being the Texas Panhandle).  At
the "regional level" the question was whether or not 
weekly spot cattle prices decrease when captive supply
slaughter increases.
1Captive supplies include marketing
agreements, forward contracts and packer-fed cattle.
2The full report, “Econometric Analysis of Fed
Cattle Procurement in the Texas Panhandle,” by J. R.
Schroeter and A. Azzam is available at:
 www.gipsa.gov/gipsa/progser/p&s/txpeer/reportindex.h
tm. 
This article is an edited excerpt from the Executive
Summary of the Report.  
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When a packing plant purchases cattle on the spot
market, it is purchasing those cattle not for immediate
slaughter, but to fulfill slaughter needs for some future
period. It stands to reason that the average price a plant
pays for a lot of spot cattle would be influenced, at least to
some extent, by the proportion of the future period's
desired slaughter that is already met with pre-scheduled
deliveries of captive supplies (assuming, as seems justi-
fied, that captive supply deliveries for the near-term future
are known at least roughly, by the packer). So it makes
sense to search the data for a connection between a
packer's near-term future slaughter of captive supplies and
the prices the packer is paying for spot market cattle
"today."
The finding was that if a typical plant's proportion of
slaughter accounted for by captive supplies were to
increase by one percentage point, relative to the competing
plants’ proportions, then one would expect the spot market
prices paid by that plant for cattle of given quality to
decline somewhere between 0.002 $/cwt. and 0.004 $/cwt.
(on a live-weight basis) relative to regional average prices.
When the relationship between captive supply usage
and price at the regional level was investigated, it was also
found that cattle prices declined as captive supply usage
increased. The results, moreover, when taken at face value,
suggest that the impact of captive supplies on price is
reasonably substantial.3
But does that mean that  increases in aggregate cattle
supply deliveries cause the spot market price to fall? Or,
for that matter, does the causality run in the other direc-
tion: do low spot market prices create an incentive to
deliver large volumes of captive supplies? 
To understand the economic mechanism responsible
for the short-run of the negative relationship at the plant
level, one must recognize that any given regional market,
at any given point in time, is characterized not by a single
price but by a distribution of prices for fed cattle. Prices
paid for individual lots of cattle vary, in part, because of
lot-to-lot variation in cattle quality.  But they also vary due
to random variation in the strength of competitive forces
throughout the market area. On a given day, a feed-yard in
one part of the region may be visited by only one buyer
and, consequently, receive relatively "low" bids. In other
parts of the region, competition among bidders from two or
three firms may be the norm and transaction prices may be
higher.
When a packer enters the spot market knowing that a
relatively large proportion of its typical slaughter volume is
committed for the near-term future in the form of already-
scheduled captive supply deliveries, it will usually want to
purchase correspondingly fewer spot market cattle.  This
can normally be accomplished with relatively conservative
bidding. As a result, it will succeed in procuring the desired
number of spot market cattle at relatively low prices where
only one or, perhaps, no other bidders contend for cattle,
but will generally be outbid (or will decline to bid in the
first place) where it finds two rival bidders already vying to
make purchases. When, on the other hand, a packer enters
the market needing to secure a relatively large share of
near-term future slaughter volume with cash purchases,
bidding behavior must be more aggressive and the resulting
transactions prices correspondingly higher.  So it is not
surprising that packers with a relatively high captive supply
proportion of near-term future slaughter will pay spot prices
that are slightly below the regional average price, other
things equal.
For a given distribution of transaction prices, it is of
little or no consequence to feeders that packers who
currently have a relatively high degree of reliance on
captive supplies  tend, other things equal, to be the ones
paying relatively low prices within the distribution. What
matters to feeders is whether the use of captive supplies
causes  the regional average price to fall, shifting the entire
distribution downward. To be sure, the regional-level
analysis did uncover evidence of a negative correlation
between the weekly volume of captive supply slaughter and
the week’s average spot market price for the region. The
crucial question is: what economic mechanism is responsi-
ble for the finding? One candidate explanation has to do
with the impact that current prices and the expectation of
future prices have on the incentives of feeders and packers
to schedule delivery of captive supplies.
From interviews with packers and feeders in the Texas
Panhandle, it was found that marketing agreements nor-
mally give feeders the right to determine the number of
cattle delivered in a given week, but require that they notify
packers of this number two weeks in advance of actual
delivery. Thus, in the current week, feeders determine the
number of marketing agreement cattle they will deliver to
packers two weeks hence. Under conventional pricing
formulas, marketing agreement cattle delivered in two
weeks will bring a price based on the spot market price paid
for (non-formula) cattle next week.  So the expectation of
a "high" spot price next week, other things equal, will
incline feeders toward delivery of a "large" volume of
3  For example, if  the weekly volume of
captive supply deliveries were to increase from its
sample average level (about 26,400 head) by one
sample standard deviation (about 7,730 head), the
result , other-factors-held-fixed, of this change would
be a decrease in the spot price by $0.69/cwt. (on a live-
weight basis).
marketing agreement cattle in the week after next. At the
same time, however, if feeders currently expect price in
two weeks to be high relative to next week's price, they
have an incentive to postpone delivery of some of those
cattle until three weeks hence, when formula prices will be
based on spot prices for the week after next. Consequently,
we would expect that the number of marketing agreement
cattle delivered two weeks from now will be positively
correlated with this week's expectation of next week's spot
market price, and negatively correlated with the forecast
formed this week, of spot market price in the week after
next.
Now consider the incentives packers face when
deciding on the scheduling of forward contract cattle
deliveries.  Because the typical lag between purchase and
slaughter of spot market cattle is about one week, from the
packer's point of view forward contract cattle deliveries
next week substitute for spot market purchases this week. 
Assume, for the moment, that the typical interval between
scheduling and delivery of forward contract cattle is about
one week. Then a "high" spot market price this week will
prompt packers to economize on spot market purchases, to
some extent, by scheduling a large volume of the
fixed-price contract cattle deliveries next week. On the
other hand, if packers this week forecast a "high" spot
price for next week, they will hoard their limited inventory
of forward contract cattle, reserving them for delivery in
the week after next when they can substitute for spot
market cattle that would otherwise have to be purchased at
next week's anticipated "high" price. Thus, we would
expect the number of forward contract cattle delivered
next week to be positively correlated with the current spot
price and negatively correlated with the forecast formed
this week, of next week's spot price. Were we to assume
on the other hand, that the typical lag between scheduling
and delivery of forward contract cattle is two weeks
instead of one week, a similar result would be obtained.
Just as with marketing agreement cattle, delivery numbers
for two weeks from now should be positively correlated
with this week's expectation of next week's spot price and
negatively correlated with this week's expectation of spot
price the week after next. Evidence of the predicted
correlations were found in the data; especially in the case
of marketing agreement cattle.
In summary,  when the capability exists for packers
and feeders to speed-up or postpone captive supply
deliveries in response to economic incentives dictated by
changing market conditions, deliveries of marketing
agreement and forward contract cattle will tend to be
"high" other things equal, when the spot market price is
expected to be "low." But because the experienced market
participants who make the scheduling decisions are un-
doubtedly quite good forecasters of price (at least over a
relatively short forecast horizon such as one or two weeks),
their forecasts are likely to be quite highly correlated with
the actual price. So the tendency for weekly captive supply 
deliveries to be negatively correlated with the unobserved
two- (or one) week-ahead forecasts of price, could manifest
itself in a negative correlation between weekly deliveries
and the observed price. This, of course, is exactly the kind
of relationship researchers find when estimating the short-
run relationship between captive supply usage and spot
cattle prices.  
This line of reasoning counsels caution in the interpre-
tation of the negative relationship between captive supplies
and spot cattle prices. The tendency for spot market cattle
prices to be "low" other things equal, in weeks in which
captive supply slaughter is "high" does not necessarily
mean that there is an underlying mechanism whereby large
deliveries of captive supply cattle in a particular week
cause that week's spot market price to fall. Even if the
week-to-week fluctuations in a region's spot market price of
fed cattle were generated completely independently of the
region's use of captive supplies, the incentives that influ-
ence the delivery scheduling decisions of feeders and
packers would still give rise to a negative correlation
between the observed spot price and the volume of captive
supplies.
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